Afghanistan: The New Endgame

The alarming pace of events in Afghanistan is forcing United States and NATO strategists to adjust their strategy and timetable to end the war. But they cannot acknowledge the flaw at the heart of their efforts.

By Paul Rogers, cross-posted from openDemocracy

A number of recent columns in this series has reflected on the interplay of military and political dynamics in the "greater middle east", from Iran to Afghanistan. to Syria. Several have examined the possibility that a process of crisis escalation involving "accidents, incidents or mavericks" - a combination summarised in the acronym "AIM" - would trigger war over Iran (see "America, Israel, Iran: mediation vs war", 16 February 2012).

A subsequent column assessing the conflict in Afghanistan concluded that United States policy there is unlikely to change much even if Mitt Romney defeats Barack Obama in the presidential election in November 2012 (see "Afghanistan: the endgame drama", 1 March 2012). But in Afghanistan as in Iran, the AIM effect may now be having an impact in a way that has implications for the future of western military power.

A political retreat 

The argument for continuity in Afghanistan draws on evidence that President Obama has decided on a timetable ^↑ for withdrawal of American troops there, hoping both that Afghan government forces can assume responsibility for security and that any Taliban role in a post-withdrawal government would be very limited. Romney's election rhetoric (and that of any plausible Republican rival) might scorn Obama's approach as "defeatism" or worse, but the next US president would follow a similar course - precisely because the western ^↑ predicament in Afghanistan is now becoming unsustainable.

The response to such acts ^↑ by American soldiers as urinating on dead Afghans and burning ^↑ copies of the Qur'an (both of which led to widespread fury and retaliatory attacks ^↑ on American targets) strengthen ^↑ the case that strategic reality in Afghanistan is becoming inexorable.

The massacre of sixteen Afghan civilians on 11 March by (it seems) a lone American soldier ^↑  confirms in bleak fashion that the "AIM" concept can shed light on the Afghan endgame as much as it does the twisting Iranian crisis. This might yet be attributed to a "maverick", but it is certainly also an "incident" in the tripartite schema - and its sheer horror, especially the killing of children, makes it one of special extremity that also betrays a deep problem within the US military.

But in combination with the earlier outrages, the massacre may come ^↑ to acquire importance as a rare example of an AIM element that will - by clarifying options on both sides - have the effect of ratcheting a conflict down rather than up. Its impact is already significant. In Afghanistan it has intensified antagonism ^↑ to the foreign military presence, as evidenced ^↑ on 15 March both in the Taliban's statement that it is suspending ^↑ preliminary talks with the US and in the demand of Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, that American forces retreat to their bases from villages and patrols.


In the US it has reinforced political pressure in favour of a speedy withdrawal. The multiple signs include the weak response to John McCain's call ^↑ for a reassertion of a "victory over the Taliban" approach. It is very doubtful that either Romney or Rick Santorum will pursue ^↑ this line to excess in the next months' campaigning.

More broadly, the impact of the desecrations that have fueled ^↑ so much Afghan anger is less to alter existing US policy choices than to consolidate those already taken by both George W Bush and Barack Obama.

A plan for failure

Indeed, the context of the last four years is relevant. George W Bush was planning for a military "surge" in Afghanistan in 2008, and John McCain would have implemented the same policy had he defeated Barack Obama - that is, injecting at least 30,000 troops with the intention of destroying the Taliban insurgency.

After many months of review, Obama in 2010 too chose the surge option - but with the singular aim of ending an unwinnable war on tolerable terms, from a position of strength. Two years on, there is little evidence of this working; Taliban groups retain their control of swathes of the country ^↑ and influence many more, all the while largely avoiding open combat that would expose them to attack.

Now, sources in Washington and London reveal that a clear line ^↑ of approach with a set timetable is being planned. The latter is not immutable; another mass-casualty attack or unexpected developments in Pakistan could alter it. But the heart of the new, three-pronged strategy is set:

* Withdraw all the "surge" forces by the end of 2012, but keep the remaining 60,000-plus American troops in Afghanistan until the latter part of 2013 - when the withdrawal accelerates
* Maximise efforts to train ^↑ the Afghan National Army (ANA ^↑ )
* Exit almost all forces by the end of 2014 - though leaving special-force units, drones and some other troops to control any resurgence of transnational paramilitarism.

This approach entails maintaining combat operations through the next two summers, 2012 and 2013 (periods euphemistically known as "fighting seasons" when they might more appropriately be called "dying seasons"). It is being championed within ^↑ Nato on the grounds that efforts during these two seasons will sufficiently weaken the Taliban to give the ANA some chance of maintaining security. In consequence, the degree of negotiated compromise with the Taliban will recede in importance.

This is a great comedown from the complete victory envisaged in late 2001, or even the successes confidently expected when Nato forces moved ^↑ into Afghanistan in very large numbers in 2006. Yet it is easy to see why from a Nato military perspective, the strategy is regarded ^↑ as the best practical way forward.

But it has a very deep flaw at its centre. The notion that two more "dying seasons" will greatly degrade the Taliban and other armed opposition groups is countered by all the experience of recent years, when the dominant pattern sees the Taliban and other groups melt away undefeated to bide their time when Nato ^↑ forces move in to "take over" an area. Many of the more thoughtful military planners are aware that this is the reality, though it cannot be admitted in polite circles.

The signs are that the 2012-14 period in Afghanistan will be messy, and potentially very difficult for the country. There is now a bottom line, however. This almost certainly will end up being a fourteen-year war that leaves in its wake huge loss ^↑ of life and very many thousands of injuries, will have consumed trillions of dollars of resources, all to reach an outcome that for Nato is utterly different to expectations.

That will not be acknowledged because to do so would undermine the validity of the whole alliance ^↑ ; and because it will not be acknowledged, many of the crucial lessons will be not be learned. That in turn makes it more than likely that Nato will stumble on through further crises, all the while avoiding the core question of whether it should even continue to exist.

Syria: A Human Security Approach

The key to any intervention is to combine upholding human rights inside Syria with de-escalation of the broader regional conflict. Far from being contradictory, these two goals – human rights and peace – reinforce each other. 

By Mary Kaldor, cross-posted from openDemocracy


The United Nations Human Rights Council has described the Syrian government’s repression of peaceful protests as ‘crimes against humanity’. Even the shocking number that is widely quoted of 7,000 people killed cannot convey the sheer horror of what is happening including shelling, torture, arbitrary detention, child-rape and other atrocities. Reports suggest some 50,000 people are missing, some 60,000 have been imprisoned, and a minimum of 15,000 (the number of refugees in Turkey) have been forced to leave their homes.

The scale of violence gripping Syria today has long crossed the line of a domestic issue. The international community is obliged both morally and legally to intervene to stop the violence – to protect Syrian civilians and to establish conditions for peaceful political change. The question is what form should such an intervention take?

What began as an inspiring non-violent protest is degenerating into something that has all the hallmarks of what I call a ‘new war’ ^↑ . The Assad regime is showing many of the characteristics of a weak state. The economic sanctions imposed by the west are beginning to take their toll. The regime cannot rely on the army. Reportedly it has been unable to call up more than 60% of the reserves.

When army units are sent to repress protestors there are usually many defections. Instead the regime relies on the Republican Guard, the intelligence agencies and some extremist militias known as Shabbiha, all of whom act with great savagery. The regime has been engaged in fomenting sectarian conflict, distributing weapons and sandbags to the Alawite community and spreading horrendous stories of ethnic hatred on the part of the majority Sunnis. It has also, reportedly begun to release criminals from gaol, a practice pioneered by Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Gadhafi. Indeed Assad has talked of creating ‘another Afghanistan’.



For its part, the opposition is fragmented. The Syrian National Council leadership is based in Paris. Coordinating Committees have been established inside Syria . The Free Syria Army with leadership based in Anatakya, Turkey, is composed of defecting soldiers who seem to have established their own independent brigades such as the Hamza Al-Qatib Brigade or the Salaheddine Al-Ayoubi brigade called after victims of the repression or historical figures. The SNC has sought to control the FSA including through the establishment of the FSA Military Council led by a higher ranking officer than the leader of the FSA. But it has met stiff resistance and the FSA seems to operate rather independently. Although in an agreement with the Syrian National Council they declared that their strategy was ‘defensive protection of civilians’, there have been a number of high profile offensive operations, such as the attack on the air force headquarters or the assassination of the head of the military hospital in Damascus just yesterday (though the FSA did not take responsibility for this). Al Qaeda ^↑ has also announced support for the opposition and may have been responsible for spectacular bomb attacks in Damascus and Aleppo.

New wars have a tendency to spread and to last a long time. Opponents of external intervention warn of the potential of igniting protracted conflict with catastrophic regional spillovers but this is even more likely to happen in the absence of any intervention, if the  current violence in Syria today is left unchecked.

The events in Syria take place at the intersection of two contravening dynamics.  On the one hand, the Arab Spring is sweeping away decades-old authoritarian regimes and threatening to upend the geopolitical status quo far beyond the region. It is creating unfamiliar and uncomfortable uncertainties from Moscow to Washington and from Bejing to Tel Aviv. On the other hand, the escalating confrontation with Iran over its quest to acquire nuclear weapons appears to be a classic case of old geopolitics. Actors are sorted into an Iran/ Syria/ Hezbollah axis with Russia and China not far behind and an Israel/US axis with Europe not far behind. Should this polarization spill into an open conflict, it would put an end to the Arab Spring’s democratic tide, turning the region into a proxy battlefield for an old/new cold war between global players.  This may be one reason why a series of apparently unrelated developments seem to be moving us inexorably towards this scenario. But the new cold war would not end in the restoration of ‘order and stability’; rather it might mean ongoing persistent violence over ever greater swathes of territory.

Up to now, outside efforts on Syria have been ineffectual. Sanctions may have weakened the economy but they do not seem to have affected the determination of those targeted. The Arab League did succeed in sending civilian monitors in in December although there were not enough of them; they did not protect civilians, and they were led by a Sudanese indicted war criminal. Nevertheless, violence does seem to have abated while they were present. But they have been withdrawn and the Arab League turned to the UN. Russia and China vetoed the UN Security Council resolution proposed by the Arab League that called on Assad to step down and hand over power to his Vice President to supervise a transition to democratic elections, giving Assad a sense of impunity. Within hours the regime had attacked the city of Homs; hence the horrific violence that we are witnessing now.

What’s next?

The next step being proposed is a UN Arab League civilian monitoring mission or peace-keeping force or both. Saudi Arabia has turned to the General Assembly which can act when blocked by the Security Council through a Uniting for Peace resolution. This would be combined with talks on a political transition. Opposition groups are suggesting more robust action. The coordinating committees propose that civilian monitors should be accompanied by armed guards. The Syrian National Council has proposed the establishment of a safe haven in the Northern province of Idlib where much of the FSA is based. The safe haven would be declared an international protectorate but would be defended by the FSA backed by western air power.

From the beginning of the uprising over a year ago a dichotomy emerged between those calling for the internationalisation of the conflict and those suggesting that it should be left to the Syrians to resolve it through dialogue. It is clear today that the latter is no longer an option.  Indeed it would be morally reprehensible to allow the slaughter to continue unchecked. The key to any intervention is to combine upholding human rights inside Syria with de-escalation of the broader regional conflict.  Far from being contradictory, these two goals – human rights and peace – reinforce each other. On the one hand, an intervention in Syria which takes account of Russian and Chinese concerns is likely to allow for a more consensual approach to Iran’s nuclear issue. Likewise, de-escalation of the conflict with Iran should reduce opposition in Moscow and Beijing to a solution that involves the removal of the Assad regime.

There is also supposed to be a dichotomy between political or diplomatic approaches or military approaches. The problem is that political or diplomatic approaches usually refer to talks with the regime and those who are committing crimes against humanity and may effectively legitimate and entrench their political role. On the other hand military approaches tend to mean war-fighting rather than the defensive use of force. The problem with this kind of military intervention is that it can easily escalate and sharpen polarisation and it may end up killing those it is supposed to protect. It can be argued that in Libya, effectively, the west intervened in a war on the side of the rebels rather than being focused on civilian protection and this may or may not have been the right thing to do. But if this were tried in Syria, it could result not in a victory for the rebels but in a widening regional conflict.

A human security approach brings together peace and human rights and involves both political intervention, broadly defined, combined with efforts to directly affect what is happening on the ground. The latter may involve the use of force but not in war fighting ways. This could mean:

- A UN-Arab League civilian monitoring mission, which would establish a presence throughout the contested parts of Syria.
- An international or regional peace force that would establish safe havens under UN/Arab League protection connected by humanitarian corridors so as to affect the reality on the ground.
- Political negotiations aimed at the removal of the Assad regime and an orderly transition to democracy
- De-escalation of the conflict with Iran over nuclear weapons. 

Such an approach would focus on minimising violence and creating conditions for peaceful and inclusive political processes as well as broader geo-political efforts to build consensus.

Baltasar Garzón And The Politics Of Justice

Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón is a heroic figure who gained international notoriety in 1998, when he ordered the arrest of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for the alleged deaths and torture of Spanish citizens.  Ten years later, he tried to fill a vacuum left by the Obama Administration by seeking to investigate whether six senior Bush administration officials, the Bush Six, were responsible for "an authorized and systematic plan for torture" at Guantanamo.  (See No Spain, No Gain)  The torture investigation languished when Garzon was suspended after being charged with abusing his powers to investigate Spanish Civil War atrocities, and the case was assigned to another judge.  As Pia Navazo writes below, Garzon's efforts to investigate killings of civilians during the era of General Franco’s dictatorship has made him a legal target, raising profound legal and moral issues.  -- Lovechilde

By Pia Navazo, cross-posted from openDemocracy

The well-known and high-profile Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón faces a private prosecution over his attempt to investigate crimes committed under the regime of Francisco Franco, which ruled Spain for thirty-six years following his forces’ victory in the civil war of 1936-39.

Garzón is accused on three separate charges of “malfeasance” for having exceeded his powers and contravened Spain’s amnesty law, passed in 1977 - two years after Franco’s death, and in the early stages of the country’s transition to democracy. Garzón himself and Spain’s state prosecutor appealed to Spain’s supreme court to dismiss the case against him, but on 31 January 2012 the judges on the court voted ^↑ (by a four-to-three margin) to reject requests from both. This ruling is independent of the final ruling on the merits of the charges.

A prosecution of judges for malfeasance is very rare in Spain. It is equally rare for the state prosecutor to support a defendant’s request for dismissal. Still, the supreme court dismissed the arguments put forward by Judge Garzón on the grounds that “they didn’t have sufficient weight”. As a result, the private prosecution of Garzón was allowed and the trial began immediately.

Judge Garzón told ^↑ the court that he did what he felt compelled to do in pursuing the investigations. He drew on precedents set by the Scilingo case ^↑ when the Argentine military officer Adolfo Scilingo was convicted by the Spanish supreme court for attempted genocide and other crimes committed during Argentina’s “dirty war” of 1976-83. The state prosecutor initially challenged that investigation but changed its position and supported the case on the basis that the crimes being investigated were crimes against humanity. At the time, the supreme court affirmed the judge’s obligation to investigate facts that could amount to such crimes.

Judge Garzón argued that he had received reports regarding detailed events that took place during and after the civil war, which involved alleged crimes such as extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances and torture. He argued further that the amnesty law only applies to crimes “of a political nature”, meaning crimes with a political connection, and - on the grounds that crimes against humanity cannot be considered political acts - rejected the allegation that he had the intention to proceed in violation of the amnesty law in investigating these crimes.

Moreover, crimes against humanity are not limited in duration, they have effects that continue over time. Judge Garzón pointed out that forced disappearances were crimes which had a “permanent” and ongoing effect as long as no bodies have been found, in part because this prevents relatives from their right to arrange a proper burial.

Judge Garzón reiterated that he sought only to defend victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation. He denied all accusations of political bias or ideology in accepting the case. It is not a matter of ideology, he said, that “there were hundreds of thousands of victims whose rights have not been addressed”. This part of Garzón’s contribution was designed to address accusations of bias against him as a result of claims that he had, in response to complaints filed by right-wing victims’ associations, relied on procedural reasons to deny his competence to investigate crimes of the same era.

Judge Garzón concluded by stating that he had always respected the law; that he took his decision based upon respect for both the national law of Spain and international laws governing human rights (he cited several precedents of the European Court of Human Rights in particular); and that he did so by following an acceptable and defensible line of interpretation.

A question of responsibility

For some, the supreme-court ruling to allow the trial to proceed must be seen as a concession by the court to Judge Garzón’s multiple enemies, both political and judicial. Others argue that it is imperative to be clear whether he has indeed committed a crime of judicial malfeasance. In any event, the legitimacy of Spain’s judicial system hangs in the balance.

So, too, does the global fight against impunity for international crimes. A conviction of Judge Garzón for a crime that amounts to an attempt to investigate mass atrocities will set a negative precedent and will be a setback in generating the will to pursue such prosecutions elsewhere in the world.

Reed Brody, legal counsel of Human Rights Watch, comments that Judge Garzón’s application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the Augusto Pinochet case created the so-called “Garzón effect”: a justice cascade that empowered victims all over the world to challenge transitional arrangements, including amnesties in different countries (such as Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, and several African states). The effect was to force courts to confirm that the obligations of a country to investigate mass atrocities cannot be extinguished by amnesty laws or the passage of time. The irony, says Brody, is that Judge Garzón is being prosecuted in Spain for trying to apply the principles that he successfully promoted internationally.

In Spain, lawyers and human-rights activists expressed support for Garzón. María Ángeles Siemens, local director of the UNHCR and president of the civil-rights association, said that “victims’ right to reparation is a part if international law and international law on human rights. In Garzón’s trial, what is being discussed is not simply the case itself, but a defence of international law when the Spanish supreme court has refused to hear the victims.”

Manuel Ollé. president of the Spanish association for human rights, said it was incomprehensible that a judge could be prosecuted when, after all, the crimes of the Franco era are crimes against humanity. Spain has clear obligations in this regard under international law, he said.

Indeed, if a judge is not competent to investigate such crimes in Spain, who shall be competent to provide justice to victims of the dictatorship and the civil war?

Attacking Iran: Lessons From The Iran-Iraq War

Military action against Iran, and even the continuing threat of attack, is likely to give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life.

 By Annie Tracy Samuel, cross-posted from openDemocracy

The presumed aim of an attack by the United States and/or Israel on Iranian nuclear and military facilities would be to weaken the Islamic Republic, particularly by hindering its ability to build a nuclear weapon. However, the history of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 calls into question the contention that an attack will weaken the regime in Tehran. Iran’s security policies, and its policy outlook more generally, have been shaped enormously by the country’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War. As the Iranians themselves continuously point to the lessons of the war and their bearing on the present day, it behooves policymakers to follow suit.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was a movement of several different groups that were united most strongly in their opposition to the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah. Following the ouster of the Shah in February 1979, the union of those groups began to break down. In invading Iran, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein assumed that the divided Iranians and their dilapidated armed forces would be unable to put up much of a fight. He was wrong. Iranians responded to the invasion by uniting against him and under their current leadership, even though many opposed the direction the revolution had taken. Iran’s leaders quickly resurrected the armed forces by halting military trials and purges and enforcing conscription.

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), which was established following the revolution to serve primarily as an internal security force, transformed into a second military and rushed to confront the invading forces. Thousands of volunteers were incorporated into both the IRGC and the regular military. They were driven to defend the country, the revolution, and the Islamic Republic by a potent combination of nationalism, revolutionary mission, and religious zeal that was stoked by the foreign threat. Their dedicated and determined defense, combined with the Iraqi forces’ poor performance, caused the invaders to stall and then retreat. The IRGC and the Basij remain today as the Islamic Republic’s most devoted defenders. They have a substantial interest in the survival of the regime, and can therefore be expected to vigorously confront attacking forces, just as they did when the Iraqis invaded.

An attack on Iran by the United States or Israel will likely add to the ranks of the regime’s supporters. Just as a divided population came together to confront the Iraqi invasion, Iranians of all stripes will unite in opposition to an attack. The upshot will be a stronger, more cohesive, and more militant Islamic Republic. In the wordsof Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s reformist former president and a harsh critic of some of Iran’s current leaders and policies, “If there should one day be any military interference in Iran, then all factions, regardless of reformists or non-reformists, would [unite] and confront the attack.” Iranians interviewed by Reuters, Radio Farda, and the Campaign for Human Rights in Iran made the same argument. “A war will unite the regime, and it will also force many to unite behind a regime they don’t even support” said a 56-year-old woman living in Tehran. “What else should we do, [cheer] for Israel, which would kill our countrymen working in the nuclear sites?” Similarly, a Tehran-based journalist who said he sympathized with the opposition Green Movement wrote that, “[Iranian] society will not welcome any country that attacks its soil.”


An attack on Iran will not only bring Iranians together under the current regime; it will also unite them in support for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Even if it targeted Iranian nuclear facilities and was limited in scope, an attack will most likely be interpreted by Iranians as a declaration of war, an attempt at regime change, and a determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology or enrichment capability of any nature. It will also convincethem that acceleratingthat drive and ultimately possessingnuclear weapons is the only wayto safeguardtheir regime and their country from future attack. Hans Blix, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently put forward this view. “I don't think you can convince anyone to give up an atomic programme through the threat of violence,” he stated. “Rather, it will cause them to move even faster on it, in order to defend themselves. ... If the decision to build a bomb has not yet been taken, a military strike would ensure more than ever that it is.”

While the regime may increase its strength in the wake of an attack by winning new supporters, it may also be able to capitalize on an attack to eliminate its internal enemies. That is precisely what happened following the 1980 Iraqi invasion. Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies used the war to strengthen their control over the state along the war-making state-making nexus, followingthe pattern of revolutionary elites in other countries. Throughout the war Khomeini used the conflict to discredit and eliminate his internal rivals. By keeping the people mobilized for the war and focused on Iran’s external enemies, he was able to consolidate his power with fewer constraints and less debate.

Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the powerful IRGC would be able to achieve similar results in the case of a strike on Iran. The Revolutionary Guards have long warned of the dangers posed by Iran’s external enemies and have characterized internal opposition as the work of external forces. An attack on Iran will seemingly vindicate the IRGC’s position and enable them to increase repression and their own power. Iranians favoring any sort of softer line will be undermined and suppressed. Hossein Ghazian, an Iranian sociologist who was jailed in Iran and is now a visiting scholar at Syracuse University, said that, in the case of an attack, the regime would have “enough legitimacy, excuses, and reasons to repress those opposed to it.”

Similarly, in a 2005 op-ed in The New York Times, Iranian human rights activists Shirin Ebadi and Hadi Ghaemi put forward “The Human Rights Case Against Attacking Iran.” They argued that, “for human rights defenders in Iran, the possibility of a foreign military attack on their country represents an utter disaster for their cause.” The authors also drew a parallel with the Islamic Republic’s behavior following the 1980 Iraqi invasion. The “threat of foreign military intervention will provide a powerful excuse for authoritarian elements to uproot [independent human rights organizations] and put an end to their growth,” they argued. “Human rights violators will use this opportunity to silence their critics by labeling them as the enemy’s fifth column. In 1980, after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran and inflamed nationalist passions, Iranian authorities used such arguments to suppress dissidents.”

In a report released by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran in November 2011, Ghaemi, writing as the president of that organization, emphasized that the parallel is still valid. In summarizing the views of Iranians interviewed by the Campaign, Ghaemi wrote that, “an attack would further militarize the state, exacerbate the human rights crisis in Iran, and undermine Iranian civil society and the pro-democracy movement. ... A military strike would likely lead to an upsurge of political violence, threatening all those considered enemies of the government. Given the mass executions of numerous political prisoners during the Iran-Iraq War, strong fears were expressed about the fate of hundreds of current political prisoners in the event of a conflict with the United States.”

Military action against Iran, and even the continuing threat of attack, is likely to give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life. Its devoted supporters will be strengthened and mobilized, and it will enjoy the additional support of those who will join in condemning and retaliating for an attack. Threats of a possible strike, and certainly a strike itself, substantiate and animate the security narrative Iranian leaders have been propagating for years: that the West is determined to raze the Islamic Republic. They have mastered the art of using the threat of attack, signs of Western hostility towards Iran, and even invasion to consolidate their power. Further, the more likely an attack appears, the more determined Iranians will be to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The policy of attacking and threatening Iran has served as the lifeblood sustaining the Islamic Republic. We have yet to see how the regime might sustain itself without it.

Vaclav Havel: Living In Truth

By Mary Kaldor, cross-posted from openDemocracy

It is hard to imagine a world without Vaclav Havel. Human, self-deprecating, witty and even absurdist, often wrong as well as right, he represented a rare voice of integrity, courage and optimism in an era that is depressingly lacking in political leadership. His autobiography To the Castle and Back captures the quintessentially Czech character of his life – a fairytale in which a dissident playwright becomes a President in Kafka’s castle and later returns to not quite normal life. It is introspective and gloomy yet pierced through with new projects and jokes. For example, he describes how he nearly had a nervous breakdown when half-cooked potatoes were served to the Japanese Emperor. ‘Fortunately, he understood this to be a Czech culinary speciality.’ He also explains that now he is no longer president, nobody knows what to call him: Mr President, Mr Former President or even just Mr Havel. ‘It’s only a matter of time before someone addresses me as “Mr former Havel”’

I first met Vaclav Havel at a meeting in Prague in 1988 that was supposed to bring together the West European peace movement and Charter 77. Unfortunately, we were all arrested and the foreigners were thrown out of the country, accused of being ‘NATO agents posing as tourists’. (Coincidentally, Christopher Hitchens, who also died this week was also there and, like me, was forced to spend our visit to Prague in police stations and the airport). Long before that meeting, however, I had been in correspondence with Havel and he had been a regular contributor to the European Nuclear Disarmament Journal, which I edited during the 1980’s.

When I first came across Havel’s ideas and the ideas of the Czech intellectuals around him, it seemed to me that they had discovered a new conceptual language in which to express the kind of politics that I was engaged in. Many of them had become window cleaners or boiler stokers or like Havel, spent time in prison in the ‘normalisation’ after 1968 and they had used the time to read and think. Havel invented concepts like ‘Anti-Politics’– a sphere of society that escapes the total hold of the overbearing state; ‘Living in Truth’– the notion of refusing the lies of the political class; or the ‘parallel polis’– the idea of an Aristotelian polis organised around the good life which would, as it were, spread out and gradually chip away at the formal political institutions. In ‘The Power of the Powerless’ Havel described the grocer who puts the slogan ‘Workers of the World Unite’ in his shop window, not because he believes it but as a badge of loyalty. His emphasis on acting autonomously according to one’s conscience and on human solidarity guided his politics throughout his life.


Less well-known in the west are his anti-materialist and anti-consumerist views. Moreover, western commentators have tended to ignore the fact that his ideas applied to the West as well as the totalitarian East. In ‘The Power of the Powerless’ he talks about the ‘global technological civilisation’:

‘The post-totalitarian system’ wrote Havel ‘ is only one aspect – a particularly drastic aspect and thus all the more revealing of its real origins – of the general inability of modern humanity to be master of its own situation. The automatism of the post-totalitarian system is merely an extreme version of the global automatism of technological civilisation. The human failure that it mirrors is only one variant of the general failure of humanity. ...It would appear that the traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the automatism of technological civilisation and the industrial-consumer society, for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along. People are manipulated in ways that are infinitely more subtle and refined than the brutal methods used in post-totalitarian societies. …In a democracy, human beings may enjoy many personal freedoms and securities that are unknown to us, but in the end they do them no good, for they too are ultimately victims of the same automatism, and are incapable of defending their concerns about their own identity or preventing their superficialisation or transcending concerns about their own personal survival to become proud and responsible members of the polis, making a genuine contribution to the creation of its destiny.’

I did not always agree with him. We published the ‘Anatomy of Reticence’, a wonderful essay about why Czech dissidents were sceptical of the peace movement because of the way the Soviet Union had transformed the word ‘peace’ into Orwellian double speak. But I was horrified to find disparaging remarks about  some courageous Italian women peace activists who had travelled to Prague to get signatures for a woman’s appeal against missiles in Europe; in the essay, he described feminism as a ‘refuge for bored housewives and dissatisfied mistresses.’

I also disagreed with his belief in a Euro-Atlantic community. He had great faith in the American variant of democracy even as he criticised the US role in Central America. It was this faith that led him to support ‘wars for human rights’, as he described the Kosovo war, and to support the invasion of Iraq.  In 1985, he had signed the Prague Appeal of 1985, addressed to the European peace movements, which called for the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and for the establishment of a pan-European security system based on the Helsinki principles. Many of us were disappointed that, after becoming President, he favoured the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO instead. But it was not actually a change of heart; for him, NATO represented the Euro-Atlantic community and the expansion of NATO was easier to achieve than a new security arrangement.

What was always striking about Havel was his consistency and his honesty. Even after 1989, Havel continued to support civil society. He was one of the founders of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly (an idea borne out of that fateful 1988 meeting) whose aim was to create a pan-European civil society and to support civil society in difficult places. I was the Chair of HCA during the 1990s and he continued to help us by hosting meetings of civil society groups in conflict zones, especially the Balkans, at the Castle. More recently, he has done a lot to support dissidents in China.

But perhaps most importantly he has been the inspiration for and indeed the embodiment of a set of ideas about non-violent ways of changing the relationship between state and society, about building politics from below, about the role of conscience as political power that underpin the global protests that we are witnessing today, especially in the Arab world. His death is a huge loss. We desperately need his kind of politician if the current popular uprisings are to find an institutional response.

Tunisia's Elections: Consolidating Democracy

By Ayman Ayoub, cross-posted from open Democracy

The Tunisian people in December 2010 sparked the popular movement that became known as the Arab spring and opened new horizons for freedom in the region. Now, on 23 October 2011, they completed a vital round of their nascent democracy by delivering Tunisia's first genuinely democratic and competitive elections since the country's independence in 1956.

This achievement belongs to Tunisians above all, but it is also a great occasion for democrats and supporters of democracy around the world. To see the long queues of Tunisians awaiting their chance to cast a vote for the future of democracy in their country is a delight and a source of hope. For many of these voters - young and old, women and men - this was the first occasion to express their real choice freely, in an orderly fashion and with no fear or intimidation.

The remarkably high turnout - up to an astonishing 90% of the electorate in many areas, according to official data released by the electoral authorities - is a clear indicator of the Tunisian people’s thirst for dignity, and their determined will to build a democratic society. It is notable here that some waiting voters protested against an attempt by the head of one leading political party to bypass the queue by using a common expression from the days of revolution: "Dégage!" In calling him back to join the queue, they were also affirming something profound about equality of citizenship. That is where democracy starts.

This exceptional expression of "civism" in Tunisia also represents a clear signal of the real objectives of the Arab uprisings at large. This is a region that has suffered from long decades of dictatorships, oppression and injustice. Now, a new generation is crying out "enough" - and voicing to the entire world that it also deserves a chance to join the ever increasing community of democratic nations. The success of the elections in Tunisia is undeniable evidence of the popular will underlying the peaceful demands sweeping the Arab world for freedom and democracy.

The next task

The newly elected constituent assembly will now face the task of delivering what could be the Arab world's pioneering democratic constitution, to be developed by a legitimate and representative body. The unquestioned legitimacy of the assembly, regardless of the exact balance of seats between the various parties, ensures that large parts of Tunisian society will feel directly included and involved in its work.

The participation of such a big number of political parties and forces also shows the exceptional levels of expectation that the Tunisian people and its emerging elites have in these elections - albeit this very diversity also represents a technical challenge for both voters and the Instance Supérieure Independante pour les Elections (ISIE, the independent electoral management body).


What now remains to be seen is the ability of all parties, in principle and in practice, peacefully to accept the results; and especially of those in the lead to take the responsibility of respecting and building on the evident political diversity of Tunisian society. The elected constituent assembly needs to ensure that the constitutional process continues to be as inclusive and participatory as the elections have been, beyond the actual electoral results; and to benefit from the input and contributions of all Tunisians, both winners and losers of these elections.

Tunisia's elections also have a vital regional dimension. Egyptians and now Libyans have been able to topple their dictatorships, while Syrians and Yemenis (among others) are continuing their struggle for freedom. Many in both categories may see in Tunisia's elections an additional sign of hope, for these offer tangible evidence that the path to democracy is a viable one - confirming that democracy is possible here and now.

In their procedures and processes too, the elections should provide relevant lessons that can be used in the actual or potential democratic transitions of other Arab countries. The coincidence that the elections came on the same day as National Transitional Council's declaration that Libya was at last fully liberated from Gaddafi´s rule is a further positive symbolic augury.

It is important to remember amid the celebration that elections only constitute one pillar, however fundamental, of the democratic "construct". Indeed, democracy-building is a long-term process that involves much more than elections alone. The creation of a society based on the rule of law, toleration of different views, freedom of the press and media, and the integrity and accountability of public institutions are also vital components. The successful step in the right direction that the elections represent should encourage movement towards the full accomplishment of these goals.

Tunisians have made a giant leap towards democracy. The tyrannical regimes that continue to resist their society's demands, such as Syria and Yemen, should see in it a clinching argument that there is no force on earth able of defying an awakened people's call for freedom, justice and dignity.

Ayman Ayoub is regional director of the west Asia and north Africa programme at International IDEA. He is lawyer by training whose work has primarily focused on the provision of specialised assistance services for elections and democratisation processes in transitional and post-conflict countries

Iran And America: Components Of Crisis

By Paul Rogers, cross-posted from openDemocracy

The Arab awakening of 2011 has to a degree refocused international attention away from Iran. A number of current developments, most prominently the allegation that a high-level official in Tehran was involved in a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, is now exposing Iran's regime to renewed scrutiny. The suspicion and hostility that marks the political relationship between Iran and the United States mean that this shift may have very serious implications.

The indictment issued on 11 October 2011 by a federal court in New York against two men - Manssor Arbabsiar, an Iranian-American (and US citizen, arrested on 29 September), and Gholam Shakuri, a senior figure in the elite Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] - states that the murder plan originated in Iran and got as far as approaching (and paying a first instalment to) a would-be assassin linked to a Mexican drug-cartel. The belief, drawing on the testimony of Arbabsiar, is that the perpetrators intended (inter alia) to explode a bomb in a restaurant where the target was dining, which would almost certainly have killed other people.

The Barack Obama administration has reacted to the news by calling for intensified United Nations sanctions against Iran, on top of those already imposed on account of Tehran's nuclear-energy programme and the uncertainties over its exact purpose. The secretary of state Hillary Clinton describes the operation as "a dangerous escalation of the Iranian government's longstanding use of political violence and sponsorship of terrorism". Iran strenuously denies any role in what it regards as based on a fiction concocted by the country's adversaries. The affair is thus already becoming another episode in an enduring pattern of enmity between the two states.

There is as yet little substantive detail on an investigation that US federal agencies had apparently been pursuing for four months. Some of the alleged plot elements are odd, not least an amateurish approach that is untypical of the IRGC - as in the supposed hiring of a drug-gang associate who turned out to be a federal informant (see Joby Warrick, "Investigators initially doubted plot had Iran ties", Washington Post 12 October 2011).



The logic of confrontation

Washington shows every degree of confidence that it can justify the charge of senior Iranian participation in an actual operation. If the available information proves to be accurate, this raises two questions: how senior were those in Tehran behind the plan, and what does this and their involvement reveal about the current political context in Iran?

Iran's power-structures are factional and rivalrous. There has for some years been regular jockeying for position and prestige, a situation that long preceded the presidential election of 2009 which gave rise to huge street-protests. The regime's crackdown on the reformist tendencies that came to prominence then has now been followed by a new phase of barely concealed intra-elite manouevring between the various camps (see Nasrin Alavi, "Iran: an elite at war", 27 May 2011).

The IRGC, which established its reputation during the destructive Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), is a vital part of the regime's armoury. It is close to being "a state within a state", in that it both has powerful and autonomous economic interests activities and is determined to present itself ideologically as the truest guardian of the revolution of 1979. This image is becoming harder to uphold in a situation where millions of young Iranians have little interest in distant heroics and are more concerned with the difficult realities of their present.

The Revolutionary Guards need an enemy to justify their purpose and project their legitimacy. The Americans filled this role with the abrasive rhetoric of the George W Bush administration against Iran following 9/11, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave Tehran no reason to change its attitude. A number of mini-crises in the years since, especially over Iran's nuclear plans, has always found the IRGC among the most combative of Iran's power-centres.

Yet the regional environment is changing, and with accelerating speed. Most US troops are now leaving Iraq; several Arab regimes hostile to Iran have collapsed in the face of largely non-violent uprisings, and others (including Iran's ally, Syria) are threatened; Iran's Shi'a co-religionists are at the forefront of protest (and the prime targets of repression) in Bahrain; of the Arab states only Saudi Arabia, now also determined to subdue dissent among the Shi'a of the eastern region, presents a strong diplomatic challenge to Iran (as does Turkey).

This combination - the IRGC's rooted sense of self-interest and destiny, and a new geopolitical context where many strategic calculations are under review - suggests that what may underlie the Washington plot is the desire of elements within the IRGC to justify its own continued importance and relevance. A serious crisis, one that might even spill over into war, would certainly satisfy that requirement.

The Washington plot may thus turn out to be a deliberate provocation intended to incite a US response. There is an echo here of the argument of some analysts that al-Qaida conducted the 9/11 attacks in order to lure the "far enemy" into Afghanistan, and then mire it in an unwinnable war (as the Soviet Union had been in the 1980s). How far ahead the IRGC has calculated, if this is indeed part of its logic, it is at present impossible to say.

The new ingredients

But irrespective of the validity of this analysis, three further substantial points need to be factored in. The first is that the more hawkish foreign-policy voices and figures in Washington have alighted on the assassination plot with enthusiasm, for two reasons. It confirms their critique of Iran as the leading regional foe of the US - the pivot of the "axis of evil"; and the timing is very good in electoral terms.

The presidential-election campaign for 2012 is gathering pace. There will be great pressure on Republican candidates to take a very hard line against Iran, and the contenders will be drawn to outbid each other over what robust action is needed. Indeed, a political sense of the need to appear patriotic and not be outflanked may well inform the Obama administration's reaction to the plot.

The second point, which applies to both sides in the domestic American debate, is the growing US concern over the independence of Nouri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad. This does not automatically translate into excessive Iranian influence, for the Iraqis are conscious of their own distinct religious history and not amenable to manipulation (see Tim Arango, "Vacuum is Feared as U.S. Quits Iraq, but Iran's Deep Influence May Not Fill It", New York Times, 9 October 2011). But it is troubling to Washington that the Iraqi prime minister and his foreign-affairs officials have offered support to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus, effectively siding with the Iranians on this issue (see Joby Warrick, "Iraq, siding with Iran, sends essential aid to Syria's Assad", Washington Post, 9 October 2011).

It is relevant here that a signal if unacknowledged aim of terminating the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 was to establish a pro-American order in Iraq in parallel with a similarly pliant government in Kabul. These, along with the US navy's fifth fleet, would (it was believed) constrain Iran. Instead, the overall outcome of the decade's intervention for Iran - for all the latter's internal problems - has been to strengthen rather than weaken its regional position. Iraq's support for al-Assad is a specific example.

The third point concerns Iran's nuclear programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in recent weeks been more forthright in its concern over Iran's nuclear programme; the IAEA's former deputy director, Olli Neinonen, says that Iran could reach a state of "breakout" with enough highly enriched uranium by the end of 2012 (see "The Iranians 'Tricked and Misled Us'", Spiegel Online, 10 October 2011). This would not in itself entail a direct nuclear-weapons capability, but it would mean that the potential for that can be realised within months.

Neinonen does not advocate a military strike; neither, as far as can be judged, does the Obama administration. But other influential voices in Washington, and some senior figures in Israel, do (see "Israel vs Iran: the risk of war", 11 June 2010).

The next phase

The alignment of the murder plot, the nuclear issue, international sanctions, and the changing regional enviroment suggests that a move is underway towards another period of potential clash of arms with Iran.

In such periods, crises can quickly erupt and escalate in uncontrollable fashion. The possibility of a military confrontation between the United States (or Israel) and Iran is one such danger (see "The next Iran war" [16 February 2006]; "America and Iran: the spark of war" [20 September 2007]; and "Iran, America, Israel: the nuclear gamble" [2 October 2009]).

If a significant group within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps really has been preparing a violent and brutal attack within the United States, knowing that its action will make outright war a real prospect, then this danger will be harder than ever to contain. All the more reason for the US not to give the group what it wants. This will require astute and far-sighted leadership in Washington. In the event of a real crisis in the coming months, a persuasive argument for a constructive and peaceful resolution that avoids the catastrophe of a new war must be made at the highest level.

America's Wars: The Logic Of Escalation

By Paul Rogers, cross-posted from openDemocracy

The United States political-military strategy for draw-down in Afghanistan is in trouble, even as Washington is tempted by increased high-tech military engagement in other theaters of war. 

The killing of Afghanistan’s former president Burhanuddin Rabbani in a suicide bomb-attack at his home in Kabul on 20 September 2011 removes a senior player who for decades was at the centre of the country’s political scene. A major incident in itself, which led the current Afghan president Hamid Karzai to return home from New York to attend the funeral, Rabbani’s death follows the concerted assault on key targets in central Kabul on 13-14 September that lasted twenty hours.

The exact responsibility for Rabbani's death is still to be established. But this and similar operations - such as attacks on Kabul hotels, and on the offices of the British Council in the city on 19 August - reflect the ability of the Taliban to hone tactics in recent months in response to the "surge" in United States troops into Afghanistan.

There is a specific and two-sided context here. First, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups have been seeking to maintain control of rural districts in parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan, using both subtle and violent means. The endemic government corruption and maladministration creates a base of support for these groups, many of whom can build on their pre-existing links with the same communities; such support can be supplemented by often ruthless intimidation.

Second, the paramilitaries face substantial dangers in engaging openly with the increasing numbers of US troops that can be deployed to suppress any large-scale insurgent activity. Such more open confrontation has worked in the past (especially against some of the more remote US outposts), but the Americans’ huge manpower and firepower superiority underpins a shift to assassinations and suicide-martyr missions.

The impact of the Taliban’s refocus may be less important militarily than in psychological and political terms. The death of Rabbani, who was involved in negotiation with the Taliban, makes any talks process less likely to produce results. The broader Kabul attacks, embarrassing as they are, don't of themselves constrain greatly US and other Nato troops; but they confirm that these forces do not control the country, and make it harder for them to contemplate an early withdrawal.

This is a real problem for the Barack Obama administration, which wants to accelerate the drawdown of forces as the US presidential-election campaign of 2012 begins to dominate calculations.


A spreading conflict

It is not clear how this strategic conundrum will be resolved. To clarify what is at stake, it makes sense to look at current Pentagon options from a wider perspective - one that stretches well beyond Afghanistan-Pakistan, and even Iraq.

The reason is that the war itself is no longer confined to these regions. The bombing of the United Nations offices in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, on 26 August 2011 symbolises its expansion. There is now a growing conviction among US security analysts that three groups across northern Africa - Somalia's al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in the north (possibly including Libya), and Boko Haram in Nigeria - are beginning to coordinate their actions and knowledge (see Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, “U.S. sees big threat in 3 African groups”, New York Times, 16 September 2011).

The interconnections between these groups are believed to be hardening; and Pentagon sources highlight the proliferation of paramilitary technologies (such as improvised explosive devices [IEDs] across south Asia, the middle east and north Africa - often via the transfer of technical experience gained in one conflict to another (see Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “IED Cat and Mouse”, Defense News, 12 September 2011).

There has been much talk of al-Qaida being reduced to little more than a rump. The reality is that this applies only to the original entity, already quite limited in reach. What has evolved is a very much more diffuse network, one that the Pentagon seeks to defeat without wanting to commit ground-troops in any significant numbers (see "America's military: failures of success", 12 May 2011).

There is an exception here: the use of special forces to carry out night-raids in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These continue, even though there is ample evidence that they lead to more opposition to US forces (see “Study: NATO night raids cause Afghan backlash”, AFP/Defense News, 19 September 2011).

More significant, however, is the notable increase in the reliance on armed-drones, especially in Yemen and Somalia. Drones now fly from a facility in the Seychelles (following a series of trials there), while a new CIA airstrip in Saudi Arabia supplements existing drone-operations based in Djibouti and directed mainly at Yemen. A further base is being established in Ethiopia, intended mainly for operations in Somalia (see Craig Whitlock & Greg Miller, “U.S. assembling secret drone bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsular, officials say”, Washington Post, 21 September 2011).

The possession of bases in four countries has two advantages. The first is the degree of geographical overlap; this allows more detailed and extensive surveillance and attack operations. The second is the availability of back-up; if one of the countries involved undergoes a political change of heart, then others are available to take up the strain.

Beyond the legacy

This rapid expansion of drone capabilities is provoking a debate within the White House over how extensively the drones can be used. The core question is: should the targeting be restricted to more senior paramilitary leaders, or should it seek out many more - hundreds, or even thousands - of low-level militants? (see Charlie Savage, "At White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight", New York Times, 15 September 2011).

For the moment, the practice leans towards the former option; but this already raises a host of legal issues around what is essentially targeted assassination with not even the pretense of an attempt at capture and legal process (see "Drone warfare: cost and challenge", 23 June 2011).

The context of the debate is that the Barack Obama administration is facing sustained problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and a growing threat in Yemen and northern Africa. The availability of armed-drones presents a tempting military option that combines apparent effectiveness with (in terms of American casualties) zero cost.

Yet even leaving aside the considerable legal and moral questions, there are strategic perils. For if radical Islamist groups continue to spread their influence (as seems likely) this will invite the routine application of armed-drones in what amounts to generalised warfare, quite possibly far beyond Yemen and Somalia. Drones have already been used in Libya against Gaddafi's forces, and - now that Nato has extended its air operations by three months - could be again (either if the former leader’s supporters remain active, or if jihadists form a new challenge). Even Nigeria might offer convenient targets (see "Al-Qaida franchise: the Nigerian case", 25 August 2011).

The prospect of such escalation is very far from the original hope of many of Obama's advisers that the “war on terror” could be greatly reduced in scope (if not ended altogether) before 2012 and the end of his first term. That increasingly looks vain - and even worse, there is a real chance that this administration’s last year will see a steady expansion of the war. Such an outcome would be the direct opposite of the promise of 2008, and yet more evidence of the toxic legacy that George W Bush bequeathed to his successor.

Every Casualty: The Human Face Of War

By Paul Rogers, cross-posted from openDemocracy

The idea of recording, identifying and acknowledging each individual victim of armed conflict - and holding to account those responsible - extends the principles underlying the laws of war.

From the Soviet Union to Libya, the story of a single American submarine - the USS Florida - throws light on the transition to the post-cold-war world. The Florida was an Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine launched in 1981, at the start of the most dangerous period of that conflict, and commissioned two years later. It was then one of the most powerful warships ever built.

At the start of its career, the Florida was equipped with twenty-four vertical missile launch-tubes, each carrying a Trident missile. Each missile was fitted with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (the so-called MIRVs) armed with W-87 thermonuclear warheads rated at nearly 500,000 tonnes of explosive power. The Florida, to put it bluntly, could have destroyed every city in the old Soviet Union, and with bombs to spare - such was the ludicrous overkill of those supposedly stable days.

With the end of the cold war, the Soviets and Americans began to scale down their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Ohio-class boats, however, had plenty of life left in them and the search was on to find them new roles. The Florida was one of four boats in the class that were converted into a new role - carrying conventionally-armed Tomahawk cruise-missiles. The Florida had good potential as a cruise-missile boat. Its launch-tubes were adapted to take multiple capsules for the missiles, allowing it to deploy 154 Tomahawks instead of the mere twenty-four Trident ones.

The Tomahawk missile itself has been around since the 1970s. The ground-launched nuclear-armed version was deployed in the early 1980s - amid huge political controversy and demonstrations - at European bases such as England’s Greenham Common. There were also nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed sea-launched Tomahawks carried on warships and submarines; a modern version of the latter, the UGM-109E Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM-Block4), is on the Florida.

The capacity of each missile in this range is immense. It can operate in all weathers, and  night or day; it has a reach of up to 2,480 kilometres; it can carry either a high-explosive “unitary” warhead or large numbers of cluster-munitions; and it has a guidance and targeting computer that is fully integrated inThis military story has an obvious strategic aspect, namely that these modified Ohio-class boats provide the United States with yet another form of global strike. But it also carries an equally obvious but far less noted consequence: that these missiles are used to kill people, and the identity and fate of those on the receiving end are no part of this military or any other story (see "The casualties of war: Libya and beyond", 7 July 2011) to the US navy's network-centric system, involving inputs from multiple sources including satellites and reconnaissance drones.

The cost

Why is all this “anorak” stuff worth mentioning? The reason is that the Florida was a few months ago nearing the end of a fifteen-month-long around-the-world patrol that kept it away from its home base in the United States. Then, in March 2011, the air-campaign against the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya was launched - and the Florida was by then near enough Libya’s coastline to be called into service. In the event, this boat alone is reported to have fired about 130 of its missiles at targets across northern Libya at the start of the war (see Christopher P Cavas, “U.S. Sub Force Sharpens its Sense of Self”, Defense News, 29 August 2011).

This military story has an obvious strategic aspect, namely that these modified Ohio-class boats provide the United States with yet another form of global strike. But it also carries an equally obvious but far less noted consequence: that these missiles are used to kill people, and the identity and fate of those on the receiving end are no part of this military or any other story (see "The casualties of war: Libya and beyond", 7 July 2011).

The Florida's missiles are only part of a much larger six-month-long air campaign in Libya in which more than 1,000 targets have been hit, many of them repeatedly. The defence ministries in London, Washington and elsewhere have routinely provided the press with details of these targets - whether they be tanks, rocket-launchers, radar-sites, warships, trucks, intelligence bases or even psychological-warfare centres (see "The age of high-tech war: after Libya", 9 September 2011). What is odd is that there is never any record of anyone getting killed or injured. It is as though every single target is wholly devoid of human presence.

The reality is very different, and this can be established in detail. For modern systems used for bomb-damage assessment - including drones, electronic intercepts, satellites and reconnaissance aircraft - cumulatively allow the planners to gather details of the human costs of the attacks. They know - but they, or their political and diplomatic masters - choose never to publish the facts and figures.


This refusal echoes the much wider attitude in the higher reaches of almost every army engaged in war, expressed most pithily by General Tommy Franks in March 2003: “We don't do body counts”. In fact, "they" often do just that, but refrain from communicating the results.

The challenge

A research and campaigning initiative launched in September 2011 - the Charter for the Recognition of Every Casualty of Armed Violence - seeks to highlight and address this deficiency. It is part of a broader development in which the Oxford Research Group’s Every Casualty project has played a vital role (as have other NGOs working on individual conflicts assembled in the International Practitioner Network).

Much of the impetus comes from groups such as Iraq Body Count, as well as those with experience of gathering information about victims in the wars of ex-Yugoslavia. A remarkable example is the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Centre, which produced the Bosnian Book of the Dead. This compendious work - published in 2007 but still being updated - records the 97,207 citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina killed and missing in war of 1992-95 war.

The Bosnian Book of the Dead - and companion projects in Kosovo, El Salvador and Guatemala - are valuable projects that combine scrupulous historical research with respect for the integrity of each individual victim of war. The new campaign seeks to extend this approach in two ways: by applying it to conflicts as they happen, and simultaneously to place responsibility on the people doing the killing.

The idea is simple: if you go to war and kill people, it is incumbent on you to say who you have killed and in what circumstances. As such it is a natural (if belated) step in extending the laws of war, not least the Geneva conventions.

There is a long way to go, but the fact that the idea already has surprisingly wide appeal may be significant (see "The harvest of war: from pain to gain", 28 October 2010). After all, even around 2000, few people would have expected a convention on anti-personnel landmines to be agreed so soon; even in 2006, few saw any chance of getting a ban on cluster-bombs.

True, the United States - with its cluster-equipped Tomahawks - has not yet signed up to the latter. It may take many years for states to embrace the charter, and even longer for sub-state groups to accept any kind of responsibility for the violence they inflict. But at a time of bitter conflict in many war-zones - including Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria - this initiative is worthy of support. The recording, identifying and acknowledgment of “every casualty of armed violence” is an idea whose time has come.